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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

: Case No. 910017

v.

:

ROBERT P. HAGEN,

: Category No. 14

Defendant-Respondent.

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that

this Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank. No.
860196, a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of
Utah. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied. 479
U.S. 994 (1986), that would have any practical effect?
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction
of error" standard of review applies, and this Court gives no
deference to the court of appeals' legal conclusion.

Citv of

Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 536 (Utah), cert,
denied. Ill S. Ct. 120 (1990); Provo Citv Corporation v. Willden.
768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).

2.

Did the court of appeals erroneously refuse to

remand defendant's case to the trial court for reconsideration of
the jurisdictional question under a correct allocation of proof
and a proper standard of proof?
The standard of review noted in paragraph 1 applies
here,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1). Pursuant to a plea
bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge (R. 33, 36-43).
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment
and to withdraw his guilty plea, challenging the court's
jurisdiction on the basis that he was an Indian who had allegedly
committed a crime in Indian country and thus was subject to
federal court jurisdiction only (R. 53-58).

After an evidentiary

hearing, the court denied defendant's motion, sentenced him to a
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, and ordered
him to pay various fines and restitution (R. 61, 63-64; T. 2526).
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed defendant's
conviction and ordered him discharged, concluding that (1) under
-2-

Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), Myton, Utah is
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian
Reservation, and that the Utah Supreme Court could not reach a
contrary decision in State v. Perank, No. 860196, a pending case;
(2) the trial court had applied an incorrect burden and standard
of proof in ruling that defendant was not an Indian for
jurisdictional purposes; and (3) remand to the trial court for a
determination of defendant's Indian status under a correct
allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard of proof
was not appropriate.
1990), cert, granted,

State v. Haaen, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah Ct. App.
P.2d

(Utah 1991).

On January 22, 1991, the State filed a petition for
writ of certiorari in this Court.

On April 23, 1991, that

petition was granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential facts are not in dispute.

Defendant

pleaded guilty to distribution of marijuana, which occurred in
Myton, Utah.
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction:
(1) defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life,
attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4); (2) he
had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past six or
-3-

seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business meetings
and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) although he is not
a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of the Little Shell
Tribe of the Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is not recognized by
the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4); (4) he had
received money distributed from a fund administered by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) —

a fund which had been created pursuant

to a money judgment won by various bands of the Pembina Chippewa
Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5) he had received free health
care from the Indian Health Service (IHS) his entire life (T.
10); and (6) that he had 5/16ths Indian blood (T. 11).
In a brief cross-examination of defendant, the
prosecutor established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood;
that his mother, although an Indian, was not an enrolled member
of any tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a
grandmother who was an Indian and a grandfather who was halfIndian; and that he recieved no benefits in Utah other than the
free health care from IHS1 (T. 11-13).

The State presented no

independent evidence.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court denied
defendant's motion.

Avoiding the question of wheth€*r Myton, Utah

is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian
Reservation, the court determined that defendant is not an

1

Defendant qualified this by indicating he also was
receiving money from the BIA every year (T. 13).
-4-

Indian.

It stated:
The court does not meet the question of
reservation status because the court finds
that the defendant is not an Indian under any
definition which the court believes can be
reasonably applied in this case. . . . The
court finds that in fact there is a great
diversity of definitions of what constitutes
the status of an Indian. Because of the
great diversity and because there needs to be
at least some reasonable uniformity in the
establishment of that, the court finds that
the standard applied by the Codes of Federal
Regulations and by the Ute Indian Tribe in
defining that as an enrolled member of a
federally recognized tribe is an appropriate
one.
The court does not base it on that
determination alone, but I do believe that in
order for there to be some variation from
that we must have at least clear and
convincing evidence. Not just preponderance.
There must be substantial evidence shown that
there is a reason to vary from that
definition, and the court finds that has not
been shown in this case.

(T. 25-26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erroneously concluded that this
Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank, No. 860196,
a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
994 (1986), that would have any practical effect.

That

conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a number of
decisions from other jurisdictions, including the United States
Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the court of
appeals' holding on this point and resolve the issue of whether
-5-

Myton, Utah is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah
Indian Reservation in conjunction with the Court's resolution of
the identical issue in Perank.

If the Court were to conclude in

Perank that Myton is not within the reservation, there would be
no question the trial court had jurisdiction over defendant.
As to the specific issue of whether Ute Indian Tribe
correctly concluded that Myton is within the confines of the
reservation, this Court should consider the State's argionents in
Perank in light of the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990).

That decision,

as opposed to Ute Indian Tribe, applies the correct test for
disestablishment and follows an analysis nearly identical to that
used by the State in Perank in its argument that Myton is not
within the reservation.
Finally, the court of appeals erroneously held that
defendant's case must be dismissed on the ground that the State
failed to establish jurisdiction by carrying its burden of
proving that defendant is not an Indian.

Because jurisdiction is

not an element of the crime, remand for reconsideration of the
Indian status question under a correct allocation of the burden
of proof and a proper standard of proof would not offend double
jeopardy principles.

Accordingly, the Court should reverse the

court of appeals' holding that remand was prohibited and, if
resolution of the Perank issue so requires, remand the case for
reconsideration of the Indian status/jurisdiction issue.
-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THIS COURT COULD NOT REACH A DECISION IN
STATE V. PERANK, NO. 860196, A PENDING CASE,
CONTRARY TO UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF
UTAH, 773 F.2D 1087 (10TH CIR. 1985) (EN
BANC), CERT. DENIED, 479 U.S. 994 (1986),
THAT WOULD HAVE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT.
A. Court of Appeals' View of Federal Precedent
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative
basis for jurisdiction in state court that Myton, Utah is not
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation
(T. 18). In ruling that it had jurisdiction over defendant, the
trial court did not address that question, basing its decision
solely on its determination that defendant was not an Indian (T.
25).
In the court of appeals, the State acknowledged that in
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that Myton is within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation.

However, it informed the court

that whether Myton is actually within the confines of the
reservation is an issue pending before this Court in State v.
Perank, No. 860196, and suggested that, "since the decision in
Perank has the potential of mooting the jurisdictional issue, it
[might] be wise for the Court to wait for that decision before
issuing an opinion in the instant case."

Br. of Appellee at 5.

Without citing to any authority, the court of appeals summarily
-7-

rejected the State's suggestion, concluding:
The Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear
to hold open any role for the state courts in
refining its holding in Ute Indian Tribe.
While we have not been acquainted with the
precise arguments advanced by the state in
Perank, we are hard-pressed to see how, given
the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, our state courts could
reach a contrary decision that would have any
practical effect. Seeing no possibility of
an effective decision in Perank contrary to
the result in Ute Indian Tribe, we see no
reason to await the Perank decision,
especially since defendant is presently
incarcerated.
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747.
This conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a
number of decisions from other jurisdictions —

i.e.,, this Court

is entitled to its own view on reservation status.

See, e.g.,

State v. Janis, 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); compare Stankev v.
Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977), with United States v. Long
Elk, 565 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1977).

Indeed, certiorari was

granted by the United States Supreme Court in both DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975), and Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), because the Supreme Court of
South Dakota had reached a different result than had the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether a reservation had been
disestablished.

Neither of those cases suggests that the state

court was not free to disagree with the federal court on the
reservation issue.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of
appeals' holding that the Utah appellate courts are bound by Ute
-8-

Indian Tribe, and resolve the issue of whether Myton is within
the reservation's exterior boundaries in conjunction with the
Court's resolution of the identical issue in Perank.

As the

State argued in the court of appeals, if this Court were to
conclude in Perank that Myton is not within the reservation,
there would be no question the trial court had criminal
jurisdiction over defendant.

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,

411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d
449, 459 (7th Cir.) (state court has jurisdiction to punish an
Indian who commits a crime off the reservation and within state
territory), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984).
B. Additional Argument on Disestablishment Question
In Perank, the State has fully argued its position that
Ute Indian Tribe was wrongly decided and that the original Uintah
Reservation was disestablished and today consists of only
tribally owned "trust lands," of which the town of Myton is not a
part.

Br. of Respondent at 17-48 (a copy of this portion of the

State's brief is attached as an appendix).

Because the Court is

aware of the State's position on the issue, the arguments
advanced in Perank will not be repeated here but are simply
incorporated by reference.

However, after Ute Indian Tribe was

issued and after Perank was submitted to the Court for decision,
the Tenth Circuit decided another reservation disestablishment
case, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company v. Yazzie. 909 F.2d

-9-

1387 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990)2, which
deserves brief discussion.
Yazzie represents a retreat by the Tenth Circuit from
the basic rationale employed in Ute Indian Tribe.

Further,

Yazzie supports the State's position in Perank that the en banc
panel in Ute Indian Tribe used an erroneous analysis in reaching
its decision.

The Yazzie panel, unlike the Ute Indian Tribe

panel, followed the correct legal test for determining whether or
not an Indian reservation has been diminished.

In Perank, the

State argued that the United States Supreme Court had delineated
a clear test in Solem v. Bartlett and preceding cases (see
discussion in Br. of Resp. at 17-27).

The State also pointed out

why Ute Indian Tribe had erroneously perceived Solemt as setting
forth a new test, which it did not.

Unlike Ute Indian Tribe,

Yazzie adopts virtually the same analytical test the State has
urged this Court to follow in Perank.
1389, 1393, 1395-96.

See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at

Thus, this latest decision from the Tenth

Circuit confirms the State's reading of Solem for the test to be
applied in determining whether reservation boundaries have been
diminished, which includes an examination of subsequent
legislative and executive treatment and demographics.

In fact,

the analysis and organization used in Yazzie is very similar to

2

On August 8, 1990, the State brought this case to the
Court's attention in a letter of supplemental authority filed
pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
submitted the Tenth Circuit's slip opinion. Since then, the
opinion was amended slightly and is reported in amended form at
the citation noted.
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that used by the State in Perank.

Regardless of how this Court

decides Perank and the instant case, the decision should be
reached by using the correct analysis set forth in Solem, and not
the faulty analysis used in Ute Indian Tribe.
As opposed to Ute Indian Tribe, Yazzie gives the proper
emphasis to the "restored to the public domain" language used in
the specific legislation opening a reservation to entry.

In

Perank, the State argued that the Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 245),
which began the disestablishment process on the Uintah
Reservation, clearly stated that the surplus lands were to be
restored to the public domain.

That statement appeared in the

operative section of the 1902 Act.

Under Solem and its

predecessor cases, the phrase "restored to the public domain" was
very strong evidence of a congressional intent to disestablish a
reservation (see discussion in Perank, Br. of Resp. at 18-26).
Ute Indian Tribe viewed Solem as a retreat from this longstanding principle of construction.

Yazzie, on the other hand,

correctly reads Solem and gives "restored to the public domain"
its proper consideration as an important part of the analytical
test.

See Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1397-1405.
Indeed, the Yazzie panel was critical of Ute Indian

Tribe's treatment of the "public domain" language:
Our conclusion in Ute that the generic phrase
["restore to the public domain"] was
ambiguous is undercut . . . by our
conflicting statement earlier in the same
opinion that public domain language implies
"a wholesale diminishment of the

Reservation." Moreoverf our conclusion
is
unexamined and unsupported in the opinion.
-11-

909 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added)•

In short, Yazzie supports the

State's argument in Perank that the "restored to the public
domain" language in the 1902 Act is a strong indication of a
congressional intent to diminish the reservation.
Finally, while the general analytical test and result
in Yazzie are correct, the court's rationale in distinguishing
Ute Indian Tribe is not.

See 909 F.2d at 1399-1400.

The en banc

panel in Ute Indian Tribe simply misread Solem and totally
discounted the public domain language in the 1902 Act.

Yazzie

distinguishes Ute Indian Tribe on the ground that the "restored
to the public domain" language was not included in the subsequent
1905 Act (33 Stat. 1048).
Act —

However, the 1902 Act —

not the 1905

established Congress's baseline intent to diminish the

Uintah Reservation (see Perank. Br. of Resp. at 33-38).
The issue is whether the 1902 Act or the 1905 Act was
the operative legislation opening the Uintah Reservation.
1905 Act did not purport to change whether
disestablishment.

The

there would be a

Congress's baseline intent that the unallotted

lands were to be restored to the public domain was clearly stated
in the 1902 Act.

The 1905 Act merely addressed the manner and

procedures for accomplishing disestablishment.

See Rosebud Sioux

Indian Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (see discussion in
Perank, Br. of Resp. at 33-37).

This conclusion is further

buttressed by the clear statement in the Presidential
Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119) that the Uintah
Reservation was opened pursuant to the 1902 Act (see Perank, Br.
-12-

of Resp. at 36-37)•

This was the position asserted by the

original Tenth Circuit panel in Ute Indian Tribe (716 F.2d 1298
(10th Cir. 1983)) and by the dissent in the en banc opinion on
rehearing (773 F.2d at 1101-16 (Sethf J., dissenting)).

This

Court should consider Judge Seth's discussion of the 1902 and
1905 Acts in those opinions.
In sum, because the Uintah Reservation was
disestablished by the 1902 Act, the site of defendant's crime was
not within Indian country, and the state district court therefore
had jurisdiction.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO
REMAND DEFENDANT'S CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
ISSUE UNDER A CORRECT ALLOCATION OF THE
BURDEN OF PROOF AND A PROPER STANDARD OF
PROOF.
In the court of appeals, the State conceded that the
trial court had incorrectly placed the burden on defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an Indian,
acknowledging that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1990)3,
the State had the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction (i.e.,
that defendant was not an Indian) by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Haaen, 802 P.2d at 746-47; Br. of Appellee at 5-9.

Although the court of appeals did not note it, the State cited
3

Section 76-1-501(3) provides:
The existence of jurisdiction and venue
are not elements of the offense but shall be
established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
-13-

the position it had taken in Perank on this issue: A defendant
who challenges the court's jurisdiction on the ground that he or
she is an Indian carries the initial burden of producing prima
facie evidence to establish Indian status; and the defendant must
produce evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to
raise a jurisdictional question.

See United States v. Hester,

719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983).

Once that threshold showing

is made, the burden shifts to the state, and it must carry the
ultimate burden of persuasion on jurisdiction.

Ibid.A

The State then requested that defendant's case be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of defendant's
Indian status under a correct allocation of proof and a proper
standard of proof.

Ibid.

This request was premised on the fact

that both the trial court and the prosecutor had proceeded under
a misinterpretation of the law in an area that had not yet been
settled by a Utah appellate court (i.e., what burden and standard
of proof applied to the Indian status question for purposes of
state criminal jurisdiction). Furthermore, the question of
Indian status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact
which is most appropriately determined by the trial court.

A

See

Although a number of courts have adopted a contrary view
of which party carries the ultimate burden of proof, see, e.g.,
State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 253 (1989) (the
defendant bears the burden of proving Indian status by a
preponderance of the evidence); Jones v. State, 94 Nev. 679, 680,
585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1978) ("the accused must shoulder the burden
of establishing his Indian ancestry if he seeks to challenge
state court jurisdiction), the State's position in Perank finds
considerable support in the case law and is consistent with the
plain language of section 76-1-501(3).
-14-

United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d at 457 (Indian status for
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government
carries the burden)5.
5

In light of the court of appeals' holding that Ute Indian
Tribe required it to consider Myton as being within the
reservation, the Indian status question was critical to the
jurisdictional issue.
Under federal law, states may assume jurisdiction over
Indian lands with the consent of the Indian tribes. See 25
U.S.C. §§1321(a), 1322(a). Although Utah statutory law provides
for the assumption of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-36-201
to -213 (Supp. 1991), no Indian tribe has consented to state
jurisdiction. United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n.7
(10th Cir. 1985) .
Therefore, the general rules of criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian land apply. "Determining which sovereign or
sovereigns have jurisdiction turns on a two-step inquiry: 1)
where the offense took place; and 2) whether the defendant or
victim was Indian or non-Indian." St. Cloud v. United States,
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (D.S.D. 1988). In the instant case,
assuming that Myton is part of the reservation, the central
question is whether defendant is an Indian, such that the state
court would not have jurisdiction over him for the drug crime he
allegedly committed in Indian country. If defendant is an
Indian, the federal government appears to have exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute him for the alleged offense. See
United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (federal
district court has jurisdiction over Indian defendant accused of
distribution of marijuana and possession with intent to
distribute hashish, in violation of federal statute); People v.
Luna. 683 P.2d 362 (Colo. App. 1984) (state lacked jurisdiction
to prosecute Indian defendants for alleged sale and distribution
of controlled substances in Indian country). See also State v.
St. Francis, 151 Vt. 384, 563 A.2d 249, 251 (1989) ("If
defendants are 'Indians' and the crimes were committed in 'Indian
country,' then Vermont has no jurisdiction over defendants.").
If defendant is not an Indian, it appears that the state
court would have jurisdiction. See State v. Snvder, 119 Idaho
376, 807 P.2d 55 (1991) (a non-Indian motorist's driving under
the influence of alcohol on a road within the boundaries of the
reservation was not a crime against an Indian or the general
Indian populace, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the
state); State v. Herber. 123 Ariz. 214, 598 P.2d 1033 (1979)
(state court conviction of non-Indian for possession of marijuana
on an Indian reservation upheld); State v. Jones, 92 Nev. 116,
-15-

The court of appeals rejected the State's request for a
remand on the grounds that, given the evidence developed in the
trial court, the State simply could not carry its burden of
establishing jurisdiction "in the absence of any evidence
establishing jurisdiction," and that the State is not "entitled
to a second chance to put on evidence addressed to the
jurisdictional issue."

Hagen, 802 P.2d at 748. On the latter

point, the court stated that "[w]hen reversal results from the
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, further trial
proceedings are not in order[;] [o]n the contrary, the conviction
is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged."

Ibid.

(citing State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)).

This suggests that the court of appeals considered

further proceedings to be barred on double jeopardy grounds.
However, such a conclusion is contrary to the better view adopted
in many jurisdictions that double jeopardy is not a bar to
further proceedings when there has been a failure to establish
jurisdiction in an initial prosecution.

See, e.g., State v.

Miller, 47 Ohio App.3d 113, 547 N.E.2d 399 (1988); State v. Love,

546 P.2d 235 (1976) (reversing district court's dismissal of
charges against a non-Indian for possession of marijuana on an
Indian reservation). This would hold unless it were shown that
defendant's distribution of a controlled substance was a crime
against an Indian. See Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is
limited to crimes committed 'by non-Indians against non-Indians
. • . and victimless crimes by non-Indians'") (quoting Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984)); State v. Larson, 455
N.W.2d 600 (S.D. 1990) (state did not have jurisdiction to
prosecute a simple assault committed in Indian country by nonIndian against an Indian).
-16-

5 Kan.App.2d 768, 625 P.2d 7 (1981); State v. Russo, 70 Wis.2d
169, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975).

It is also contrary to the plain

language of section 76-1-501(3) which explicitly states that the
existence of jurisdiction is not an element of the crime.
Illustrative of the view that a remand for
reconsideration of the jurisdictional question would not offend
double jeopardy principles is State v. Hutcherson, 790 S.W.2d 532
(Tenn. 1990).

There, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed an

intermediate appellate court decision which had reversed the
defendant's conviction and dismissed the case because the state
had failed to prove venue and jurisdiction.

In holding that the

lower appellate court had correctly concluded that the state
failed to establish venue but had erroneously dismissed the case,
the supreme court emphasized that failure to prove venue is a
procedural error and is not tantamount to a failure to present
sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime charged.
790 S.W.2d at 534-35.

Noting that, consistent with double

jeopardy principles, a finding of procedural error may result in
a remand for a new trial while the finding of insufficient
evidence to prove the crime cannot, the court stated:
It seems that the basic distinction is
whether the defect that requires reversal
involved the guilt or innocence of defendant.
Proof of venue is necessary to establish the
jurisdiction of the court, but it is not an
element of any offense and need only be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Venue has nothing whatever to do with the
guilt or innocence of a defendant. . . .
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not
preclude retrying a defendant whose
conviction is set aside because of an error
-17-

in the proceedings.

We are of the opinion

that failure to establish venue is in that
category and retrial does not violate that
constitutional command.
790 S.W.2d at 535 (emphasis in original).
Based on the reasoning of Hutcherson, this Court should
reverse the court of appeals' holding that remand was prohibited
and, if the resolution of the Perank issue so requires, remand
the case for reconsideration of the Indian status cjuestion under
a correct allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard
of proof, and in light of whatever additional evidence is
presented by the parties.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
reverse the court of appeals' holding that this Court is bound by
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ute Indian Tribe and that the
case could not be remanded for reconsideration of defendant's
Indian status.

Furthermore, the Court should decide the

reservation issue in conjunction with deciding Perank, with
particular attention paid to Yazzie, which provides significant
additional support for the State's argument in Perank that Myton,
Utah is not within the reservation.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /5

id

day of August, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
(/
Assistant Attorney General

-18-

MICHAEL M. QUEALY
J
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Petitioner was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Joel D. Berrett, Attorney for Respondent, P.O. Box 262,
Roosevelt, Utah 84066-0262, this /3^-*aay of August, 1991.

SvkAndi

-19-

J^.Szz^Up^ytoSi

J\J
£>&]

ADDENDUM

IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860196

v.

Priority 2

CLINTON PERANK,
(Supreme Court No. 860243)
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OP RESPONDENT
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, PRESIDING,
REVOKING THE PROBATION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
AND EXECUTING A SENTENCE OF 0-5 YEARS
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON
FOR THE OFFENSE OF BURGLARY,
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DALLIN W. JENSEN
Solicitor General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL M. QUEALY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

KIRX C. BENNETT
BENNETT AND JUDD
319 West 100 South, Suite B
VERNAL UT 84078
Attorneys for Appellant

Basin. And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be
said that Perank•* status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections
1152 and 1153 was not established below.
ARGUMENT
X.

THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country

as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allegation that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of
jurisdiction.

The following section of this brief will demon-

strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished
and today consists only of ••trust lands,H and Perankfs offense
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished.

This

is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation
which show that it has been disestablished.
A.

General Principles Governing Disestablishment
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263),

as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the
public domain and opened for public settlement under the homestead and townsite laws.

It is settled law that some surplus

land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe
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v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), and DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other surplus land acts did not,
see, e.g,t Mattz v, Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v,
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69.

As explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has established a "fairly clean analytical structure91 for distinguishing those surplus
land acts that of their own force effected an immediate diminishment of the reservation from those acts that simply permitted
non-Indians to purchase land within an existing reservation and
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id.
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime
took place in Indian country, we must examine that decision in
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents.
1.

The en banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that

the historic reservations were not disestablished ultimately
rests on the proposition that restoration to public domain language is not the same as a congressional state of mind to disestablish and does not reliably establish the clear and unequivocal
evidence of Congress9 intent to change boundaries.

In so hold-

ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judges who had considered
this case before Solem agreed that such language was synonymous
with disestablishment.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303

(panel opinion); id^ at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521
F.Supp. at 1122 (district court opinion).

To the en banc major-

ity, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of
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interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Courtfs
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reservations. Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the
Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any
of the congressional enactments in question11.

Ute Indian Tribe,

773 F.2d at 1090-91.
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct.

Solem did

not establish new "standards91 and it did not alter the principles
announced in Seymourf Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established
reservation boundaries.19

465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court

has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.l2)# the
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that congressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71).
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation.
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.

In each of the disestablishment cases

decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that restoration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal language of disestablishment.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589 & n.5;

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22;
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914).

In the clearest possible terms, the

Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant
••stripped of reservation status."

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446.

The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view
of the Court on this point.

Although in both cases the Court was

divided on the question whether the particular area involved had
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an
intent to disestablish.

See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id,

at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27,
446; id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

Indeed, Justice

Marshall—who wrote the Court1 s opinion in Solem—observed in his
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act expressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec.
21) was ••yet another example* of "•clear language of express termination. . . f ." Id^, 430 U.S. at 618.
Solem did not reject or alter this firmly-established rule of
interpretation.

The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did

not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the operative portions of the Solem legislation.

Instead, a reference to

"public domain" appeared in a subsequent section providing that
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tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the
public domain."

Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged

that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablishment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated,"
it could not be dispositive.

Solem, 465 U.S. at 475.

In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in
using..." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the
'public domain* inasmuch as they were available for settlement11
(id., 465 U.S. at 475, n.17).

It is evident, however, that the

Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain
language in every other instance.

The Court had already indi-

cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its comments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a drastic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of
such restoration language.
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also overlooks the Solem Court1s later observation, in the context of
subsequent jurisdictional history, that:
Unentered lands were considered a part of the
reservation. They were available for allotment to
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of
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the tribe# and they were specifically defined as
different from land in public domain*
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction
on the Cheyenne River Reservation:

An Analysis of the Causes and

Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908f at 87 (undated).

The

reference to public domain in the quoted passage can only be
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status
are mutually exclusive.!§/

In short, Solem does not signal the

Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of
restoration to public domain language.

Such language continues

to be the clearest expression of disestablishment.
2.

Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v.

Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),12/ required that the
various acts involved here—which contain identical operative
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error.

In

this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite

16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood
it, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in interpreting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area involved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "administered as part of the public domain. • . •" Id,,, at 87.
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this
agreement, the Court initially looked to the construction given a
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession language. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there explained, "[p]resumptively, the similar language used In the 1901
Cession Agreement should have the same effect.91 105 S.Ct. at
3428.
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Strip11—a 7,000-acre tract located on the edge of the original
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of May 24, 1888
(25 Stat. 157)• See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098
(Seymour, J., concurring).

Compare with district court opinion,

id., 521 F.Supp. at 1099. See also panel opinion, id,, 716 F.2d
at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-

gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in
the Gilsonite Strip. . . ."

Idk, 773 F.2d at 1098. Yet the

operative provisions concerning the Gilsonite Strip used the same
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly restored the area "to the public domain11 (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157).
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration language contained in the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted differently, and there is none.li/
3. The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with
the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment
cases. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of decisions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent
to disestablish.12/ Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior

18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the understanding of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112.
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90
(8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex
rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387
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to Solan had also assumed that such language was synonymous with
disestablishment.12/

The significance these decisions accorded

to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical
foundation and follows veil-established principles regarding
public lands. See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J.,
dissenting).

Long before the acts in question here, it was set-

tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reserves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it
loses its status as public land.il/

In 1889, for instance, the

19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v.
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins,
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 & 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J.,
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957).
District court and state court decisions in the disestablishment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Russ v.
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds. 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied? 451 U.S. 908
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 344 F.Supp.
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), affjjd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973);
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001,
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963).
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir.
1965); TooTsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir.
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513
(1839); Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v.
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131
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Supreme Court remarked that:
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands . • . has been
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a
great number and variety of cases that it may now
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles
underlying the land system of this country.
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary
to the en banc majority's view, because the reservation of a
tract removed it from the public domain,21/ later restoration of
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reservation status.il/
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also

21. (Cont'd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v.
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan.
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark.
1881). "Public domain11 and "public lands11 traditionally have
been regarded as "equivalent11 concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 490 (1901).
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior explained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation,
"[a]lthough the • . • reservation had been created out of the
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • .
•" Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950).
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 • .
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensation was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Executive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kappler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . . " Id. at
330.
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is untenable from an historical perspective.

At the turn of the

century, reservation status and public domain status were uniformly understood to be mutually exclusive.

In construing res-

toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted
to "remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished "cannot"
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased
to exist.

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. at

615.
B.

The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended,
and Today is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands
1.

Governing Principles Support Disestablishment
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread

Solem as changing the Supreme Courtfs analytical test for determining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the
pxiblic domain.

Restoration to public domain language constitutes

firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteauf 42 0
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment" (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592).
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act
as amended by subsequent acts is a key part of the analysis to
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished.

The

en banc majority did not consider this legislation In a manner
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct
result.

Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation

- 26 -

opening the reservation.

It clearly shows a congressional intent

to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under
Solem but also under the Supreme Court's prior decisions.

Sum-

marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem staad that when the
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have
occurred. • . • "

465 U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved

onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . .tf Id.
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions.

In

addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circumstances,9 and the 'legislative history1 are to be examined" in
interpreting surplus land enactments.

Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.

Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demonstrates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents.
3 below reviews these other relevant factors.

Subsection

They vividly dem-

onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the
functioning of State and local governments.
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We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation,
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation.
2.

The Uintah Reservation was Disestablished Pursuant
to the Act of May 27f 1902y as amended
a.

Creation of the Uintah Reservation
The Uintah reservation was created by President

Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the entire area within the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, comprising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles).
This was later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The
various bands of the Ute Tribe were encouraged to move to the
Uintah reservation so they would finally be settled in a designated area.

See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, for

a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah
reservation.
b.

Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act
The period around the turn of the century wit-

nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to disestablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the
public domain for settlement.

This, Congress hoped,, would

facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society.
The Uintah reservation was not the only reservation where the
allotment and surplus program was instigated; it was happening in
several other reservations in the West at about the same time

• 28 -

period.

See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-

teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67.
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians.
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat.
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the
Indians to the public domain.

The relevant portion of the Act

states:
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable
by an inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land
to each other member of said tribes, said allotments to be made prior to October first, nineteen
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted
lands within said reservation shall be restored to
the public domain; I I ~. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reser*
vat ion contained ••public domain11 language which is language "precisely suited94 to disestablishment.

DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446.

Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneipf 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amended to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated
•an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment."
592.

id. at

See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

An important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands
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could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public
land laws. Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to allotment were unsuccessful within the time limits set forth in the
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with
regard to opening the Uintah reservation.

However, this task was

made easier by the Supreme Courtfs decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had exclusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the
Indians.
c.

Action After the 1902 Act
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme

Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for
settlement and entry under the public land laws.11/

In 1904 Con-

gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905,
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33
Stat. 207).
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah

24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court in Lone
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation
without the consent of the Indians.
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reservation.

The Department of Interior viewed the administra

tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of Baking allotments to
the Indians and restoration of the surplus lands to the public
domain as set forth in the 1902 Act.

In May of 1903, Inspector

McLaughlin met with the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their consent and that allotments would be made.

The following extract

from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extinguished (JX 162, pg. 42):
Inspector McLaughlin:
A number of your speakers have said that you do
not want your land stolen from you. My friends,
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all
remain just as they are. There will be no change
in the nature of the country but the improvements
that will come when white people come in among you.
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and
you do not understand it. You are the people who
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the
light. You say that line is very heavy and that
the reservation is nailed down upon the border.
That is very true as applying to the past many
years and up to now^ but congress has provided
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold
down that line and after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Emphasis added).ihJ
d.

The Act of March 3f 1905
The time set by the 1904 Act for opening the

reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out.

Early in 1905, the

25. For a more detailed version of McLaughlin's negotiations
with the Indians, see JX 162, pp. 42-45. A subsequent report of
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utes, can be found
at LD 101, pp. 9-12.
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Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of
reservation land in order to make the allotments, so that the
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the
public domain.

This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4,

1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior
as to why he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 deadline (see LD 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly,
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely completion of the allotment program.

He thus made clear the need for

an extension of time in which to complete the allotment program.
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048),
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reservation from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided
in relevant part:
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such
tracts as may have been set aside as national
forest reserve, and such mineral lands as were disposed of by the act of Congress of May twentyseventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States, and
shall be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be
settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof; • . .
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reservation the President is hereby authorized to set
apart and reserve as an addition to the Uintah
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, and
regulations governing forest reserves, and subject
to the mineral rights granted by the act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro*
tect the water supply for the Indians or for
general agricultural development, and may confirm
such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty,
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with
the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
(Emphasis in original.)
••

The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33

Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain.
Compare Ute Indian Tribef 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12
(Seth, J., dissenting).

That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-

ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding
circumstances.
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the
"public domain91 language of the 1902 Act.

Rather, the 1905 Act

contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be disposed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President."

But the 1905 Act did not purport

to change whether there should be a disestablishment.
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act.

That had

The 1905 Act merely

addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing disestablishment.

There is no conflict or inconsistency between the

two.
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to
be disposed of under the homestead and townsite provisions of the
public land laws certainly does not constitute a restriction to
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be restored to the public domain.

The intent of the 1902 Act was car-

ried over into the 1905 Act.
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, where
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation
boundaries.

In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-

guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline
purpose of disestablishment'* (430 U.S. at 592) even though the
opening of the reservation was actually implemented by subsequent
legislation.

The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-

lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.li/
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, however, demonstrates that Congress was implementing, not abandoning, the 1902
Act's baseline purpose to end the Uintah reservation.

Compare S.

Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sees., at 14-16 (1905) (letters of
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office)
with Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting)
(N[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to

26. On this point, the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision is
contrary to its views as expressed in Hanson v. U.S., 153 F.2d
162 (10th Cir. 1946), where it was concluded that the 1905 Act
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect
the operative terms of the 1902 Act.
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change the 1902 intent. . . " ) .

See also, debates at 39 Cong.

Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103).
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land.
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to
keep the reservation intact.

To the contrary, the pertinent dis-

cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would
still be restored to the public domain.

Senator Teller, one of

the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings:
••I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at
30) (emphasis added).

Further, there is nothing in the congres-

sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uintah reservation.
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act was not only to
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public domain as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite
laws in order to prevent speculation.

Limitations on entry such

as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent with the
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
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Again,

the cumulative series of acts in this case can be compared to
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a
disestablishment.

Rosebud at 592.

That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement.

The Presi-

dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclamation, provided:
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress,
approved May 27, . . . 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among
other things, that on October first, 1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public
domain: • . . •"
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904,
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress,
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat., 1069), which last
named act provided, among other things:
[The Act is here quoted]
Now, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare • • •
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation,
excepting such as have at that time been reserved
• • ., and such mineral lands as may have been
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry,
settlement, and disposition under the general pro*
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the
United States. . . .
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added).
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment
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underlying the 1902 Act.

The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the

one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation9s Chief Executive of a perceived disestablishment* • •" (Id,, 430 U.S. at 602-03), and
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress.

See id. at 603.

On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent.
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment
In addition to examining the legislation opening a
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component
of its "fairly clean analytical structure11 is to examine the
subsequent history of the area:
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized
that who actually moved onto opened reservation
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion
of a reservation and the area has long since lost
its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra,
at 588, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to
de facto diminishment, we look to the subsequent
demographic history of opened lands as one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land on a particular reservation was
opened to non-Indian settlers.
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
The Court further noted that:
When an area is predominately populated by nonIndians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian
Country seriously burdens the administration of
State and local governments.
Solem at 471, n.12.

• 37 -

In Rosebud, the Court stated:
The fact that neither Congress nor the Department of Indian Affairs has sought to exercise its
authority over this area, or to challenge the
State's exercise of authority, is a factor entitled
to weight as a part of the "jurisdictional history.11 The long-standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90%
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not
only demonstrates the parties9 understanding of the
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable
expectations which should not be upset by so
strained a reading of the Acts. . .
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several
additional factors which strongly support disestablishment.
a.

Subsequent Administrative and Congressional
Recognition of Termination
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed

supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public domain.

The understanding of other responsible government offi-

cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President
Roosevelt9s construction.22/

Many of the documents cited in the

27. See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3
(JX 463)? Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated September 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912)
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Supervisor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at 1-2 (1914)
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated
September 2B, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (August 3,
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59
I.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December
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margin expressly recognize that, with respect to the original
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were restored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act.
The record shows as well that officials of the Interior Department treated the original Uintah reservation as having been
disestablished.

Thus, with the opening of the reservation in

1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the
original area as the "former" reservation.

For decades after the

opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the
trust lands (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status)
as the Tribe's existing reservation,11/ a practice that continued
until recently.22/

27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920
(1971) (LD 210).
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1,
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc.
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 6 6
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior).
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General).
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S.
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah &
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Grazing Report, at 1, 3
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior);
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations
in Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480).

Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are
to the same effect.12/ Numerous congressional documents subsequent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former"
reservation.

See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong.

2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).12/
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated references in congressional documents vere consistent with the policy of
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating
the Indians into society.

30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep.
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291,
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 1-2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927);
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress'
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that:
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two,
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . .
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added).
603, n.25.

See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at

31. For other past tense references to the "former" reservation, see; Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No.
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); S. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263,
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Law 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375-76)
June 21, 1906 (LD 127); H.R. Rep. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L.
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135);
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, March 31,
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD
203).
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit.

In decisions ren-

dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.21/

In-

deed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v.
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original
Uintah reservation were "restored to the public domain by the Act
of May 27, 1902. . . ."

Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court

likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to
the public domain under these Acts.

Sowards, 108 P. at 1114.

Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Tribe's reservation was considered to be only
those lands held in trust by the federal government.

Affiliated

Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation
remains intact, the en banc majority has created what must be one
of the few—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a national forest.

The district court and the panel of the court of

appeals agreed that such an anomaly was not intended and that the
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048,
1069-70, which set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addition to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the laws, rules and
regulations governing forest reserves,19 thereby diminished the

32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah
and White River Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 & 21-22;
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and
Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910).
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original Uintah reservation.
14.

Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-

The en banc Majority thought, incorrectly, that under Solem

the transfer of the administration of these one million acres
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its interest in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued
reservation status.

Despite the fact, as the federal district

court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reservations" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc
majority apparently believed that under Solea this could be ignored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090).

There is,

however, nothing in the Court's Solem opinion that justifies such
an extraordinary result.

Congress clearly ended the original

Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest,
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reservation itself.
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reservation.

In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the

inconsistency of that position with its position in other litigation involving this reservation.

In Uintah and White River Bands

of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139
Ct.Cl. at 5-6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act and then succinctly
stated the critical point:

"Pursuant to this [1902] Act and
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amendments thereto, . . . allotments in severalty . • • • were
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . .
• • were restored to the public domain, and opened for disposition under the public land laws for the benefit of the Indians11
(emphasis added).

What is more, the United States (and the Utes)

consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uintah reservation as having ended.
56, 64, 69 and 70.

E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28,

It is also worthy of note that when the Ute

Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it
up well:

"Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of

particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken

up."22/
b.

Subsequent Demographic History Supports
Disestablishment
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-

strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local governments in a myriad of areas.
character" long ago.

The disputed area "lost its Indian

It is "predominantly populated by non-

33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954).
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Indians," approximately 18,000 of them,11/ with only about 1,500
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian
Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth, J., dissenting).

The non-Indians

are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation
lands99 and have been there ever since.

Thus, there has indeed

been a de facto or de jure disestablishment.

It is their "jus-

tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries
are still intact and it is their interests the en banc majority
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that
such factors must be taken into account.

E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S.

at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
Under the en banc majority9s result, the Ute Tribe would preside over an area owned and predominantly populated by nonIndians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no
real interest as a sovereign.

At the same time, State and local

authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of
these governments, not the Tribe.

This would include increased

tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and
diminished state court jurisdiction.
The testimony and exhibits introduced in the federal district
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic

34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980).
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reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust
lands. The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area
shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the
lavs of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding
trust lands).15/

For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-

intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it
was stated as follows:
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction
over their persons. Where offences have been committed against the laws of the State, the matter
has been reported to the County authorities and the
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with
the County authorities in the maintenance of law
and order.
Id. at 2-3.

Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that

the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area beginning in the early 1900's.l§/
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State
and local officials introduced at the federal district court trial.

This testimony shows that until recently the State continued

35. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420.
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78
(testimony of George Marett, Sheriff of Duchesne County).
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to exercise primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.22/
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently,
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area, except on the trust lands.25/
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.22/

As the dis-

sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed:
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to detract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . .
773 F.2d at 1114.

37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock,
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158*59 (testimony of David
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (testimony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Feight, Utah Division of Oil, Gas 6
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by
Uintah County)•
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gordon Harms ton, Utah Department of Natural Resources) ,* 187 (testimony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Parriette, Tribe's Division of Wildlife Management and Lav Enforcement) ; and 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle).
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 6668 (JX 465); 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, at 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473).
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Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.w
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe
thought were the reservation boundaries.

The signs have been

replaced from time to tine over the years (with the signs in more
recent tines being more elaborate), but they have always indicated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation
boundaries.12/
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dispute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians,
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of
the reservation in 1905.
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances surrounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the conclusion must be that the reservation was disestablished and the
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as

40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr.
155-57) and Gordon Harmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photographs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex.
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. 1-4A, indicating the precise locations
where the various photographs were taken.

defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151. Therefore, the state district court
had jurisdiction in this Matter.
II•

PERANK*S INDIAN STATUS
18 U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 preclude state criminal

jurisdiction over "Indians19 who commit crimes within Indian country. 11/

However, these statutes do not provide a specific defi-

nition of who is an Indian.

Perank asserts that he is an Indian,

and contends that Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitutionll/
recognizes membership in the Tribe as including all children born
to any resident member of the Tribe.il/
Perank submitted two affidavits below from his father and
mother (R. 69*72), which alleged that Perank1s father is a fullblooded Indian enrolled as a member of the Ute Tribe, that his
mother has some Indian blood, and that Perank was born in
Roosevelt while the family was residing on the reservation.

The

record also contains a copy of Perank9s birth certificate (R.
76), and those of other Perank family members (R. 73-75).
As the moving party challenging the court's jurisdiction,
Perank carries the initial burden of producing sufficient
evidence, beyond mere suppositions or allegations, to establish a

41. As already shown above, the crime here was not committed
in Indian country so Perankfs Indian status is irrelevant.
42. It appears this Court can take judicial notice of the
Tribal Constitution. See Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence.
43. The Ute tribal courts have also adopted this interpretation of the tribal constitution. See Chapoose v. Ute Tribal
Business Committee, Ute Tribal Appellate Court, Civil No. 133-77
(1981).
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